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Abstract  This  paper  shows  that  women  are  more  likely  than  men  to  employ  the  fair  allocation
that most  beneﬁts  their  ﬁnancial  payoff.  The  experimental  evidence  is  gleaned  from  a  dictator
game with  production,  in  which  subjects  ﬁrst  solve  a  quiz  to  accumulate  earnings  and  then
divide the  surplus  by  choosing  one  over  ﬁve  different  allocations,  some  of  which  represent  a
fairness ideal.  The  data  also  suggest  that  women  are  more  sensitive  to  the  context  as  their
allocation  choices  depend  on  whether  they  have  accumulated  more  or  less  money  than  their
counterparts.  This  is  not  the  case  for  the  men’s  allocation  choices.
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Resumen  Este  artículo  muestra  que  las  mujeres  eligen  con  mayor  frecuencia  la  asignación
justa que  les  resulta  más  beneﬁciosa  a  su  rentabilidad  ﬁnanciera.  La  evidencia  experimental
proviene  de  un  juego  del  dictador  con  la  producción,  en  el  que  los  sujetos  primero  resuelvenJ16
un cuestionario  para  acumular  ganancias,  y  luego  dividen  estas  ganancias  eligiendo  una  de
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las  5  posibles  asignaciones  propuestas,  algunas  de  las  cuales  se  fundamentan  en  ideales  de
justicia. Los  datos  muestran  también  que  las  mujeres  son  más  sensibles  al  contexto,  dado  que
sus elecciones  dependen  de  si  han  acumulado  más  o  menos  dinero  que  sus  oponentes.  Esto  no
ocurre en  el  caso  de  los  hombres.
© 2013  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  dere-
chos reservados.
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them  (i.e.,  the  fair  allocation  that  brings  them  the  highest
payoff).
3 Technically speaking, this is a mini-dictator game because dicta-‘‘Equity  is  merely  a  word  that  hypocritical  people  use  to
cloak  self-interest’’
H.  Peyton  Young  (1994)
. Introduction
iven  the  assumption  that  economic  actors  are  largely  moti-
ated  by  self-interest,  arguments  about  fairness  pervade
he  literature  on  behavioral  economics  and  are  frequently
sed  to  explain  departures  from  equilibrium  predictions.
ecent  ﬁndings  in  the  experimental  literature,  however,
uggest  that  individuals  in  a  distributional  problem  such
s  the  dictator  game  might  apply  principles  of  fairness
n  a  self-interested  manner  (Rutstrom  and  Williams,  2000;
odriguez-Lara  and  Moreno-Garrido,  2012).  Further  experi-
ental  evidence  suggests  that  the  underlying  motivation  for
uch  fair  behavior  might  be  self-interest,  albeit  coupled
ith  a  desire  to  maintain  the  illusion  of  not  being  selﬁsh
Dana  et  al.,  2007;  Larson  and  Capra,  2009).  Along  these
ines,  some  authors  argue  that  giving  in  the  dictator’s  game
ight  be  explained  by  subjects  wanting  to  be  perceived
s  fair  (Andreoni  and  Bernheim,  2009),  because  they  want
o  avoid  the  ‘‘greedy’’  tag  (Bolton  et  al.,  1998),  or  sim-
ly  because  fairness  imposes  a  constraint  on  self-interested
ehavior  (Kahneman  et  al.,  1986).
If  self-interest  may  combine  with  principles  of  fairness
o  generate  a  behavioral  pattern  that  suggests  the  impor-
ance  of  both,  an  issue  remaining  to  be  investigated  is
ow  subjects  vary  in  this  respect  along  observable  dimen-
ions  (e.g.,  gender).  The  insights  gleaned  from  this  analysis
ight  be  important  for  both  economists  and  policymakers
n  approaching  the  problem  of  distributive  justice,  or  for
gents  understanding  the  implication  of  economic  policies.2
This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  study  gender  differences  in
ocial  preferences  by  eliciting  women’s  and  men’s  preferen-
es  over  redistribution  in  a  dictator  game  with  production.
lthough  there  is  a  considerable  literature  on  gender  dif-
erences  in  preferences  (e.g.,  Eckel  and  Grossman,  1998;
roson  and  Gneezy,  2009;  Cooper  and  Kagel,  2009)  the
urrent  paper  departs  from  the  bulk  of  the  literature  as  par-
icipants  in  the  experiment  contribute  to  the  surplus  that  is
eing  distributed.  This  feature  is  important,  as  it  generates
2 As pointed out by Debbie Walsh, the director of the Center for
merican Women and Politics at Rutgers University, understanding
f gender differences might be particularly important nowadays
ince ‘‘women may be the change [voters are] looking for’’.
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rom  property  rights  in  the  ﬁnal  distribution.  As  noted  by
herry  et  al.  (2002)  if  there  is  no  production  stage,  then  dic-
ators  might  give  money  away  because  they  are  fair-minded,
r  simply  because  the  surplus  to  be  divided  is  ‘‘manna  from
eaven’’,  and  dictators  do  not  feel  any  right  to  keep  the
ntire  surplus  for  themselves.
The  dictator  game  with  production  presented  in  the  cur-
ent  paper  consists  of  two  different  phases.  In  the  ﬁrst
hase,  subjects  earn  money  by  completing  a multiple-choice
est  that  pays  a  ﬁxed  and  a  random  reward  for  each  cor-
ect  answer.  In  the  second  phase,  dictators  allocate  the
arned  surplus  after  being  informed  as  to  the  reward  lev-
ls  (which  might  differ  across  individuals)  and  both  members
ontribute  to  the  surplus.  In  particular,  dictators  are  offered
ve  different  allocations  for  dividing  the  surplus,  some  of
hich  represent  a  fairness  ideal.3
The  experiment  is  designed  to  test  three  hypotheses.
irst,  we  want  to  test  if  some  of  the  behavioral  patterns
hat  have  been  identiﬁed  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  women
eing  more  likely  to  equalize  payoffs)  remain  when  there
s  a  production  stage  that  precedes  the  dictator’s  decision.
econd,  we  wish  to  investigate  the  hypothesis  advanced  by
roson  and  Gneezy  (2009)  that  suggests  that  women  might
e  more  sensitive  to  the  experimental  design.  This  is  done
y  studying  whether  women  and  men  behave  in  the  same
anner  when  they  allocate,  after  contributing  more  or  less
oney  than  their  counterparts.  Finally,  the  data  are  used  to
hed  light  on  how  gender  interacts  with  self-interest  when
ictators  have  to  choose  a  division  of  the  generated  surplus.
n  particular,  we  examine  whether  men  and/or  women  show
ny  tendency  to  choose  fairness  principles  in  a  self-serving
anner  by  selecting  the  principle  that  is  most  convenient  toors are not allowed to choose any division of the surplus, but have
o choose from a set of allocations. In such a set, the allocations
hat represent a fairness ideal are the egalitarian, the accountabil-
ty and the libertarian allocation. The interested reader can see
appelen et al. (2007), Konow (2000), Miller and Ubeda (2011) and
odriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) for the application and
he rationale of these fairness allocations in a ‘‘traditional’’ dicta-
or game in which dictators are allowed to choose any distribution
f the surplus. Konow (2003) is an excellent revision of the different
airness ideals.
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(2009)  by  means  of  a  within-subject  design  that  analyze  the
consistency  of  fairness  principles,  whereas  the  current  paper
relies  on  a  between-subject  analysis  with  no  repetition.4
4 Another recent paper in this literature on social preferences thatAn  experimental  study  of  gender  differences  in  distributive  
The  results  support  the  hypothesis  of  heterogeneity  in
the  use  of  fair  allocations  for  both  men  and  women  with
roughly  70%  of  subjects  choosing  a  fair  allocation  and  no  sig-
niﬁcant  differences  in  the  way  that  women  and  men  allocate
the  surplus  (i.e.,  the  unconditional  distribution  of  allocation
choices  when  subject’s  production  is  disregarded  is  fairly
close).  Despite  these  similarities  in  women’s  and  men’s  allo-
cation  choices,  some  striking  results  emerge.  Interestingly,
women  do  not  behave  in  the  same  manner  when  they  allo-
cate  the  surplus  after  contributing  more  or  less  money  than
their  counterparts,  whereas  men’s  allocation  choices  are
invariant  to  their  relative  position  with  regard  to  the  accu-
mulated  surplus  (thus,  the  distribution  of  allocation  choices
when  relative  production  is  accounted  for  is  different).  The
same  results  hold  when  considering  effort  levels.  Women
do  not  behave  in  the  same  manner  when  they  allocate  the
surplus  after  being  paid  more  or  less  than  their  counter-
part,  whereas  men  do.  These  ﬁndings  provide  support  to
the  hypothesis  in  Croson  and  Gneezy  (2009)  suggesting  that
women  are  more  sensitive  to  the  experimental  design.
The  existence  of  gender  differences  toward  the  use  of  the
most  convenient  allocation  represents  one  of  the  main  con-
tributions  of  the  paper.  We  ﬁnd  that  roughly  50%  of  women
(23%  of  men)  divided  the  surplus  according  to  the  fair  allo-
cation  that  yields  them  the  highest  payoff.  When  looking  at
those  dictators  who  are  not  selﬁsh,  66%  of  women  who  chose
a  fair  allocation  chose  the  payoff-maximizing  one,  whereas
only  40%  of  men  who  chose  the  fair  allocation  chose  it.  To
isolate  the  possible  effects  of  women  and  men’s  different
contributions  to  the  surplus,  a  logit  model  is  used  that  con-
trols  this  feature.  It  was  found  that  women  (ceteris  paribus)
are  27%  more  likely  to  choose  the  fair  allocation  that  is  most
convenient  to  them.  This  behavior  is  consistent  with  the
recent  ﬁnding  in  Miller  and  Ubeda  (2011),  who  show  that
(in  a  repeated  context)  women  are  more  likely  to  switch
between  fairness  principles,  choosing  the  most  convenient
one  across  rounds.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in
the  next  section,  the  relevant  literature  is  brieﬂy  discussed
and  the  intended  contribution  of  the  paper  set  in  context.
Section  3  presents  the  experimental  design.  The  research
questionnaire  is  described  in  Section  4.  Section  5  contains
the  results.  The  ﬁnal  section  concludes.  The  appendix  con-
tains  supplementary  material,  including  the  experimental
instructions  and  data  analysis  for  robustness  checks.
2. Literature review
Since  Rapoport  and  Chammah  (1965)  economists  have
explored  the  existence  of  gender  differences  in  behavior  by
means  of  controlled  laboratory  experiments.  The  main  ﬁnd-
ings  of  controlled  laboratory  experiments.  The  main  ﬁndings
of  the  literature  indicate  that  women  are  more  risk  averse
than  men,  have  a  lower  preference  for  competitive  environ-
ments  and  give  more  weight  to  others  payoffs  or  utilities  (see
Croson  and  Gneezy,  2009  for  a  revision).  In  the  ﬁeld  of  other-
regarding  preferences,  the  results  of  the  dictator  game
suggest  that  women  are  more  likely  to  be  socially  oriented,
whereas  men  are  more  likely  to  be  selﬁsh.  These  differ-
ences  in  social  preferences  are  expected  by  subjects  (Aguiar
et  al.,  2009),  and  are  found  to  be  signiﬁcant  in  some  studies
u
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Eckel  and  Grossman,  1998;  Andreoni  and  Vesterlund,  2001)
ut  not  in  others  (Bolton  and  Katok,  1995;  Dufwenberg  and
uren,  2006).  As  Croson  and  Gneezy  (2009)  argue,  the  lack
f  a  clear-cut  result  might  be  explained  because  women
re  more  sensitive  to  the  experimental  design.  The  extent
o  which  subjects  are  exposed  to  risk  can  also  determine
hether  the  observed  differences  are  signiﬁcant  or  not
Eckel  and  Grossman,  2008).  However,  the  magnitude  and
he  direction  of  the  gender  differences  are  still  far  from
eing  thoroughly  understood  (see  Cox  and  Deck,  2006).
The  chief  issue  addressed  in  this  paper  is  whether  gender
ifferences  in  distributive  justice  occur  when  a  production
tage  precedes  the  dictator’s  decision.  Although  the  study
f  distributive  justice  in  experiments  goes  back  at  least  to
offman  and  Spitzer  (1985),  the  majority  of  experiments
sed  to  investigate  social  preferences  consider  a  dictator
ame  in  which  the  surplus  to  be  divided  was  provided  by
he  experimenter  rather  than  earned  by  participants  (see
ooper  and  Kangel,  2009  for  a  revision  of  the  results).
lthough  economists  have  long  discussed  the  effect  of  the
rigin  of  wealth  on  individual  behavior  (e.g.,  Friedman,
957),  the  idea  of  incorporating  the  earned  surplus  into  the
ictator  game  was  not  considered  until  Konow  (2000)  and
herry  et  al.  (2002),  where  it  is  shown  that  95%  of  dicta-
ors  transferred  no  money  at  all  to  recipients,  if  dictator’s
dentities  were  anonymous  and  their  effort  levels  deter-
ined  the  size  of  the  surplus.  The  results  in  Cherry  et  al.
2002)  align  with  the  theoretical  prediction  for  selﬁsh  dic-
ators  that  has  favored  the  use  of  the  production  stage  to
licit  fairness  attitudes  toward  redistribution.  Some  recent
tudies  in  this  area  are  by  Frohlich  et  al.  (2004),  Cappelen
t  al.  (2007), Oxoby  and  Spraggon  (2008)  and  Rodriguez-Lara
nd  Moreno-Garrido  (2012), which  argue  for  the  importance
f  the  earned  surplus  to  explain  subject’s  preferences  for
airness,  although  none  of  these  studies  investigate  the
xistence  of  gender  differences  in  allocation  choices.  As
 result,  we  lack  experimental  evidence  for  how  gender
nteracts  with  self-interest  when  dictators  have  to  choose
 division  of  the  generated  surplus.  One  remarkable  excep-
ion  is  Miller  and  Ubeda  (2011),  who  consider  a  dictator
ame  with  production  played  during  twenty  periods.  In  each
eriod,  subjects  are  paid  depending  on  their  performance  in
 real-effort  task  that  consists  of  unscrambling  as  many  puz-
les  as  possible.  The  authors  show  that  when  subjects  have
o  divide  the  earned  surplus,  men  are  more  likely  to  be  self-
sh,  but  consistent  across  rounds,  whereas  women  are  more
ikely  to  be  fair  but  have  a  tendency  to  switch  between  fair-
ess  principles,  choosing  the  most  convenient  one  across
ounds.  Importantly,  the  scope  of  Miller  and  Ubeda  (2011)
and  therefore  their  experimental  design)  is  slightly  differ-
nt  from  the  one  presented  in  the  current  paper,  as  they  are
nterested  in  testing  the  hypothesis  in  Croson  and  Gneezyses a dictator game with production to investigate gender differ-
nces is Heinz et al. (2012), who consider the case in which dictators
ave to divide a surplus that only depends on the recipients’ per-
ormance.
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Lastly,  the  data  in  this  paper  also  shed  light  on  fair-
ess  as  a  context-speciﬁc  phenomenon  (Walzer,  1983;  Young,
994).  In  the  ﬁeld  of  empirical  social  choice  and  psy-
hology,  some  studies  (mostly  questionnaires)  attempt  to
valuate  several  distribution  mechanisms  and  show  that  con-
ext  matters,  as  subjects  choose  different  solutions  for  the
ame  distribution  problems  depending  on  the  prevalence
f  tastes  or  needs  in  the  story  underlying  each  question
Yaari  and  Bar-Hillel,  1984;  Young,  1994;  Scott  et  al.,  2001).
he  present  contribution  to  this  literature  is  to  show  (by
eans  of  an  experiment)  how  men  and  women  behave
hen  they  contribute  to  the  surplus  more  or  less  than  their
ounterparts.
. Experimental design
 total  of  144  students  (77  women  and  67  men)  were
ecruited  among  the  undergraduate  population  of  the  Uni-
ersity  of  Alicante.  The  experiment  was  run  in  May  2008  and
ovember  2008  in  the  Laboratory  for  Theoretical  and  Exper-
mental  Economics  (LaTEx).  Each  of  the  six  sessions  had  24
ubjects  and  lasted  around  1  h.
The  experiment  was  implemented  using  the  z-Tree  soft-
are  (Fischbacher,  2007).  Subjects  had  to  complete  a
est  during  the  ﬁrst  stage  of  the  experiment.  The  test
ontained  twenty  multiple-choice  questions  with  a  time
onstraint  of  35  min.  There  was  only  one  correct  answer
ut  of  ﬁve  possibilities.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  test,
ubjects  were  randomly  matched  in  pairs  and  assigned  a
ole  that  did  not  depend  on  their  performance  on  the
est  or  any  individual  characteristic.  Subjects  received
 random  reward  level  (pi)  for  each  of  their  correct
nswers.  The  realization  of  pi occurred  after  subjects
ere  informed  about  their  role.  Dictators  (37  women,  35
en)  were  rewarded  pd =  150  pesetas5 per  each  correct
nswer.  To  investigate  how  dictators  were  held  respon-
ible  for  their  outcomes  (Cappelen  et  al.,  2007,  2010)
nd  introduce  variability  in  the  data,  recipients  received
r ∈  {100,  150,  200} pesetas  per  each  correct  answer.  The
umber  of  observations  is  balanced  by  having  24  dicta-
ors  in  each  situation.  Thus,  there  are  24  observations  in
hich  dictators  were  rewarded  more  than  recipients  (DM:
d = 150,  pr =  100)  and  24  in  which  there  were  rewarded
ess  than  recipients  (DL:  pd =  150,  pr =  200).  In  the  remain-
ng  cases,  dictators  and  recipients  were  rewarded  the  same
pd =  pr =  150).6
5 It is standard practice for all experiments run in the University of
licante to use Spanish pesetas as experimental currency. Exchange
ate: 1 Euro = 166,386 pesetas.
6 The information on gender was collected at the end of the exper-
ment. Since roles did not depend on any individual characteristic,
e cannot control for having exactly the same number of women
nd men in each role. This procedure was chosen so as to guarantee
quality of opportunities, what is important to avoid compensation
nd control for responsibility (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2009). The
act that roles were not revealed in the experiment is also impor-
ant because dictators’ behavior was not conditioned (e.g., Aguiar
t al., 2009) and gender stereotypes were not activated (Fryer
t al., 2008).
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When  subjects  were  informed  about  their  reward  levels
nd  their  contribution  to  the  surplus,  the  total  surplus  was
ivided  according  to  the  dictator’s  decision.  Dictators  had  to
ecide  between  ﬁve  allocation  choices  to  divide  the  surplus:
1)  keeping  the  entire  surplus,  (2)  giving  the  entire  surplus
o  the  other  subject,  (3)  dividing  the  surplus  in  two  identi-
al  parts  (the  egalitarian  allocation),  (4)  dividing  the  surplus
ccording  to  the  subject’s  contribution  in  terms  of  correct
nswers  (the  accountability  allocation),  and  (5)  dividing  the
urplus  according  to  the  subject’s  monetary  contribution
the  libertarian  allocation).7
This  set  of  allocation  choices  allows  dictators  to  keep
he  entire  surplus  as  would  be  predicted  by  the  Nash  equi-
ibrium  for  selﬁsh  subjects.  Likewise,  the  ‘‘fair  allocations’’
i.e.,  the  egalitarian,  the  accountability,  and  the  libertarian
llocation)  can  be  used  to  categorize  the  subject’s  prefer-
nces  for  fairness,  as  it  is  illustrated  in  Cappelen  et  al.
2007). The  egalitarian  allocation  corresponds  to  the  idea  of
quality  (Fehr  and  Schmidt,  1999)  whereas  the  accountabil-
ty  and  libertarian  principles  consider  that  entitlements  to
he  available  surplus  are  determined  by  the  subject’s  perfor-
ance  in  the  questionnaire.  In  particular,  the  accountability
llocation  is  based  on  the  effort  exerted  (i.e.,  the  number
f  correct  answers)  and  corresponds  to  the  idea  of  equity
n  the  sense  that  those  factors  that  cannot  be  controlled
y  subjects  are  not  considered  by  dictators  when  they  are
aking  their  choice  (Konow,  1996;  Roemer,  1998).  The  lib-
rtarian  allocation,  on  the  other  hand,  takes  into  account
he  reward  levels  and  states  that  subjects  ought  to  receive
s  much  as  their  (monetary)  contribution  to  the  surplus
Nozick,  1974).
To  see  how  fairness  ideals  apply  in  a  dictator  game  with
roduction,  consider  that  the  case  where  the  total  surplus
o  be  divided  is  denoted  by y¯≥0.  We  assume  that  the  size  of
he  surplus  depends  on  the  dictator  and  the  recipient’s  mon-
tary  contributions,  which  are  denoted  by  yd ≥  0  and  yr ≥  0,
espectively.  In  particular,  yi =  piqi where  qi ≥  0  represents
ubject  i’s  performance  in  the  test  and  pi >  0  is  the  reward  for
ach  correct  answer,  for  i  ∈  {d,r}.  If  the  dictator  chooses  the
galitarian  allocation,  then  the  dictator  will  divide  the  sur-
lus  in  two  identical  parts,  so  that  each  subject  will  receive
/2,  regardless  of  his/her  performance  and  the  reward  lev-
ls.  The  accountability  allocation  implies  that  each  subject
ill  receive  the  part  that  corresponds  to  his/her  perfor-
ance  on  the  test y¯qi/(qd +  qr)),  whereas  the  libertarian
llocation  held  subjects  responsible  for  the  reward  levels
nd  pays  yd to  each  of  the  subjects.8
7 See Appendix A for the experimental instruction and Rodriguez-
ara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) for further details in the
rocedures. I note that the current paper differs from Rodriguez-
ara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) because dictators have to choose
rom a set of allocation choices instead of choosing any division of
he surplus. Besides, Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) do
ot analyze the impact of gender differences on behavior, which is
he main focus of the current study.
8 For further discussion on the relationship between responsibil-
ty or control over outputs and fairness principles see Fleurbaey
nd Maniquet (2009) and Cappelen et al. (2010) among others. Of
ourse, there exist cases in which the fair allocations overlap. This
s discussed in the supplementary material (Appendix B).
justi
c
c
e
5
I
i
i
t
1
2
a
p
t
n
(
n
t
p
f
ﬁ
p
c
c
n
o
a
t
t
i
R
t
b
c
e
g
w
doing  so  (Z  =  1.16,  p-value  =  0.123).  The  same  result  holds
when  testing  for  the  proportion  of  women  and  men  choos-An  experimental  study  of  gender  differences  in  distributive  
4. Research questions
The  main  questions  to  be  addressed  concern  the  existence
of  gender  differences  in  allocation  choices  and  the  possibil-
ity  that  women  and  men  behave  differently  depending  on
context  (i.e.,  when  they  contribute  to  the  surplus  more  or
less  than  recipients).  We  also  want  to  investigate  whether
subjects  choose  the  fair  allocation  that  is  most  convenient
(i.e.,  the  one  that  yields  the  highest  payoff)  and  the  extent
to  which  this  choice  can  be  determined  by  the  dictator’s
gender,  the  performance  in  the  test  (pi)  and  the  reward  lev-
els  (qi).  We  now  present  the  research  questions  in  detail
and  relate  them  with  previous  ﬁndings  in  the  literature  on
gender  differences.
Q1:  In  the  dictator  game  with  production,  do  men  and
women  differ  in  their  allocation  choices?  Are  men  and/or
women  inclined  toward  choosing  a  unique  allocation?
Some  evidence  from  previous  studies  that  investigate
gender  differences  highlight  that  women  are  more  socially
oriented  than  men  (e.g.,  Eckel  and  Grossman,  1998),  and  are
more  concerned  with  equalizing  payoffs  (e.g.,  Andreoni  and
Vesterlund,  2001;  Dickinson  and  Tiefenthaler,  2002).  In  that
regard,  it  will  be  worth  analyzing  whether  men  (women)  are
more  likely  to  choose  the  selﬁsh  (egalitarian)  allocation.9
The  data  in  Croson  and  Gneezy  (2009)  suggest  that
women  are  neither  more  nor  less  socially  oriented  but  their
preferences  seem  to  be  more  malleable.  The  second  ques-
tion  is  then  related  to  the  idea  of  women’s  decisions  being
more  context-speciﬁc  than  men’s  (Cox  and  Deck,  2006;
Croson  and  Gneezy,  2009)  and  the  possibility  of  behavior
varying  with  the  ‘‘price  of  giving’’  (Andreoni  and  Vesterlund,
2001).  This  is  the  main  focus  on  Miller  and  Ubeda  (2011).
Q2:  Do  men  and  women  choose  the  same  allocation
choices  regardless  of  their  contribution  to  the  surplus?
Does  their  behavior  depend  on  the  external  factors  (e.g.,
the  reward  levels)?
The  ﬁnal  question  is  in  line  with  recent  ﬁndings  suggest-
ing  that  dictators  are  likely  to  choose  fairness  principles
in  a  self-interested  manner  (Rutstrom  and  Williams,  2000;
Rodriguez-Lara  and  Moreno-Garrido,  2012).
Q3:  Do  men  and  women  choose  the  fair  allocation  that
brings  them  the  highest  payoff?The  objective  is  to  shed  light  on  the  (possible)  interac-
tion  between  gender  and  the  self-serving  choices  of  fairness
allocations.10 Hereafter  we  consider  that  the  dictator
9 Bolton and Katok (1995) is one of the studies that do not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant differences.
10 Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) provide evidence for
self-serving choices of fairness ideals. This is related to the dicta-
tor’s gender in Miller and Ubeda (2011) in a within-subject analysis.
I note that the use of the most convenient allocation might be
related to the existence of what Croson and Konow (2009) call
‘‘moral bias¨(i.e., behavior biased away from impartial standards).
Other concepts in the literature of distributive justice that might be
related to the choice of the most convenient allocation are ‘‘self-
serving biasa¨nd ‘‘egocentric bias¨(e.g., Messick and Sentis, 1983;
Babcock et al., 1995; Konow, 2000), but these concepts require
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hooses  the  most  convenient  allocation  whenever  he/she
hooses  the  fairness  ideal  (egalitarian,  accountability  or  lib-
rtarian  allocation)  that  brings  him/her  the  highest  payoff.
.  Results
n  this  section,  I analyze  the  data  gathered  during  the  exper-
mental  sessions.  First,  I  outline  the  subjects’  performance
n  the  ﬁrst-stage  quiz.  On  average,  women  had  8.64  ques-
ions  correctly  when  they  were  dictators,  whereas  men  had
1.77  questions  correctly  (standard  deviations  are  2.27  and
.77  respectively).  Women  faced  recipients  who  had  on
verage  11.32  questions  correctly,  whereas  men’s  counter-
arts  had  10.4  questions  correctly.  A  simple  t-test  rejects
he  null  hypothesis  that  women  and  men  had  the  same
umber  of  questions  correctly  when  they  were  dictators
t  =  5.23,  p-value  <  0.000).  In  addition,  the  t-test  rejects  the
ull  hypotheses  that  women  and  men  had  the  same  ques-
ions  correctly  than  their  counterparts  (for  women,  t  =  4.03,
-value  <  0.003;  for  men  t =  2.10,  p-value  <  0.043).  We  there-
ore  conclude  that  women’s  and  men’s  performance  in  the
rst-stage  quiz  is  signiﬁcantly  different.11
The  dictators’  decisions  are  summarized  in  Fig.  1,  which
lots  the  frequency  of  choosing  each  possible  allocation  by
onsidering  women  and  men  separately.  Since  no  dictator
hose  to  give  the  entire  surplus  away,  such  an  allocation  is
ot  listed  (Fig.  1).
We  see  in  Fig.  1 that  roughly  70%  of  dictators  chose  one
f  the  fair  allocations.  If  we  look  at  the  choice  of  fairness
llocations,  we  observe  that  there  is  no  unique  fairness  ideal
hat  can  be  used  to  describe  the  dictator’s  behavior.  Instead,
here  is  heterogeneity  in  the  use  of  fair  allocations,  which
s  consistent  with  Cappelen  et  al.  (2007).12
esult  1.  Women  and  men  do  not  choose  a  unique  alloca-
ion  when  they  divide  the  surplus  but  exhibit  heterogeneous
ehavior  concerning  redistribution.
In  Fig.  1,  we  observe  that  women  are  less  likely  to
hoose  the  selﬁsh  allocation  and  more  likely  to  choose  the
galitarian  allocation.  The  test  of  proportion,  however,  sug-
ests  no  signiﬁcant  difference  between  the  proportion  of
omen  choosing  the  selﬁsh  option  and  the  proportion  of  menng  the  egalitarian  principle13 (Z  = 1.33,  p-value  =  0.183)  and
o compare the dictators’ allocation choices with their choices as
mpartial judges who divide the surplus for two other subjects.
11 This gender difference in performance is consistent with previ-
us ﬁndings (e.g., Brown and Josephs, 1999; Gino et al., 2013) and
s particularly important for understanding the main results of the
aper (Result 4). Although it is found that men and women choose
he same allocation choices (Result 2), we will see that women’s
ehavior is sensitive to the context and women are inclined toward
hoosing a convenient allocation.
12 Cappelen et al. (2007) show that dictators exhibit heteroge-
eous behavior and do not allocate the surplus according to a unique
airness ideal. However, the role of gender is disregarded in their
nalysis.
13 If I compute the women’s and men’s deviations from equality,
he Kolmogorov--Smirnov test cannot reject the hull hypothesis that
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aFigure  1  Dictator’s  allocat
here  is  not  any  signiﬁcant  correlation  between  the  dicta-
or’s  gender  and  the  possibility  of  choosing  a  fair  allocation
p-value  =  0.148).  Comparing  the  distribution  of  allocations
hat  women  and  men  chose,  the  Fisher  exact  probability
ests  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  these  allo-
ation  choices  come  from  the  same  distribution  (Fisher’s
xact  =  0.351).  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  idea
n  Croson  and  Gneezy  (2009)  of  women  being  neither  more
or  less  socially  oriented.
esult  2.  Women  and  men’s  allocation  choices  cannot  be
ejected  to  come  from  the  same  distribution.
To  see  whether  decisions  are  context-dependent  or  not,
he  dictator’s  relative  position  with  regard  to  the  accumu-
ated  surplus  as  a  reference  point  is  considered.  In  Table  1,
e  report  the  p-values  of  the  Fisher  exact  probability  test
hat  compare  the  distribution  of  allocation  choices  when
ictators  contribute  to  the  surplus  more  than  recipients
yd ≥  yr)  and  when  they  contribute  less  (yd <  yr).  Dictator’s
ehavior  is  compared  when  they  are  paid  more  (pd ≥  pr)  or
ess  (pd <  pr than  recipients  for  each  correct  answer.
The  Fisher  exact  test  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  that  the
istribution  of  women’s  allocation  choices  when  yd ≥  yr is
he  same  as  the  distribution  of  women’s  allocation  choices
hen  yd <  yr.  The  test  does  not  reject  this  hypothesis  for
en,  who  seem  to  behave  in  the  same  manner  when  they
re  in  an  advantageous  position  and  when  they  are  in  a  disad-
antageous  position  with  regard  to  the  accumulated  surplus.
he  same  conclusion  holds  when  considering  differences  in
he  reward  levels.14
omen’s and men’s allocation choices come from the same distribu-
ion (KS = 0.250, p-value = 0.15). I should acknowledge that gender
ifferences in the use of the selﬁsh and egalitarian allocation might
ot be signiﬁcant because of the small sample size. Thus if the sam-
le size were larger, I would expect men to be (signiﬁcantly) more
elﬁsh as it occurs in Miller and Ubeda (2011).
14 The interested reader can see the distribution of allocation
hoices depending on the context in Appendix C. In line with Croson
nd Gneezy (2009) and Cox and Deck (2006), the data suggest
hat women might be more sensitive to the context than men. It
eems that women are more likely to equalize payoffs when they
ontribute to the surplus less than recipients; e.g., the test of pro-
ortion rejects the null hypothesis that women are equally likely
o choose the egalitarian principle when yd ≥ yr and when yd < yr,
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shoices  in  the  dictator  game.
esult  3.  Women’s  allocation  choices  are  sensitive  to
he  context  since  choices  depend  on  whether  women  have
ccumulated  more  or  less  money  than  recipients.  Women’s
llocation  choices  do  also  depend  on  the  reward  levels.
The  third  research  question  presented  in  Section  4  con-
erns  the  extent  to  which  dictators  choose  a  convenient
llocation.  To  approach  this  issue,  we  compared  the  ﬁnal
istribution  of  payoffs  (that  result  from  dictator’s  choices  in
ig.  1) with  the  (hypothetical)  distribution  of  payoffs  that
ould  correspond  to  dictators  following  the  fair  allocation
hat  is  most-convenient  to  them  (i.e.,  the  payoff  maximiz-
ng  one).15 The  Wilcoxon  signed-rank  test  cannot  reject  the
ull  hypothesis  that  these  distributions  are  the  same  for
omen  (W  =  0.75,  p-value  =  0.449),  but  it  rejects  the  same
ull  hypothesis  for  men’s  allocation  choices  (W  = 2.36,  p-
alue  =  0.018).
At  the  individual  level,  8  out  of  the  35  men  (i.e.,  roughly
3%)  chose  to  allocate  the  surplus  according  to  the  fair  allo-
ation  that  gave  them  the  highest  payoff,  whereas  18  of
he  37  women  (i.e.,  49%)  did  so.  The  test  of  proportion
ndicates  that  this  difference  in  the  proportion  of  men  and
omen  allocating  the  surplus  according  to  the  most  con-
enient  allocation  is  signiﬁcant  (Z  =  2.28,  p-value  =  0.023).
hen  the  analysis  focuses  on  dictators  who  were  not  self-
sh,  it  was  found  that  27  women  chose  to  give  money  away,
nd  18  of  them  (i.e.,  roughly  66%)  chose  the  most  conve-
ient  allocation.  There  are  20  men  who  chose  to  give  money
way,  and  8  of  them  (i.e.,  40%),  chose  the  most  convenient
llocation.  Again,  the  test  of  proportion  indicates  that  the
ifference  is  signiﬁcant  (Z  =  1.52,  p-value  =  0.063).
Overall,  it  seems  that  women  and  men’s  behavior  is  fairly
lose  when  the  production  of  the  surplus  is  disregarded,  but
n favor of the alternative that the egalitarian principle is chosen
ore frequently when yd < yr (p-value = 0.056).
15 I am not aware of any statistical test that compares distributions
f categorical data when more than two outcomes are possible and
bservations are not independent. For that reason, I decided to use
he distribution of payoffs. To control for the effect of different
eward levels (that would yield a higher size of the surplus in the
M treatment even if performance were unaffected), I transform
he data and consider the proportion of the surplus that dictators
ecided to keep so as to compare it with the proportion of the
urplus they would keep if they used fairness allocations in a self-
erving manner.
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Table  1  Dictator’s  behavior  depending  on  the  context.
Women  Men
Behavior  when  yd ≥  yr is  the  same  as  behavior  when  yd <  yr 0.033** 0.382
Behavior when  pd ≥  pr is  the  same  as  behavior  when  pd <  pr 0.007*** 0.412
p-Values for the Fisher Exact test.
*Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
Table  2  Logit  regression  to  study  biased  behavior.
Model  (1)  Model  (2)
Coefﬁcient  ME  Coefﬁcient  ME
Intercept  −0.923*
(0.55)
−1.216***
(0.40)
Women 1.241**
0.60
0.27** 1.162**
(0.52)
0.26**
DL  −0.137
(0.62)
−0.03
DM −0.888
(0.66)
0.19
Qdif  0.019
(0.06)
0.004
Pseudo  R2 0.08  0.06
LR-test 7.37* 5.29**
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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niﬁcant  according  to  the  t-test  are  deleted  in  each  step.  The
standard  errors  of  both  models  are  presented  in  brackets.16
16 The regression results are robust to a number of other speciﬁca-
tions. In particular, the marginal effects do not change qualitatively
if rather than using Qdif I consider a dummy variable DQdif that takes
the value 1 if Qdif ≥ 0, or if I include in the model the product of
the dummy variables ‘‘Women’’ and Qdif as explanatory variable.
The interested reader can ﬁnd these regressions in Appendix C. One
limitation of the data is that women do allocate a smaller surplus
than men  (p-value = 0.017), but controlling for the size of the surplus
(y¯≥0) could be problematic, especially once I control for the rela-
tive performance and the reward levels. As a referee pointed out,
it could be the case that results are due to a wealth effect, with
subjects who divide a smaller surplus (women) being more likelyNumber of observations = 72.
women  are  somehow  inclined  toward  choosing  the  fair  allo-
cation  that  is  most  convenient  to  them.  This  ﬁnding  can
be  affected  by  subject’s  performance  in  the  test.  Assume
that  women  and  men  do  have  exactly  the  same  prefer-
ences  over  redistribution  so  that  they  would  choose  the
same  allocations.  If  women  do  contribute  to  the  surplus  less
than  men  but  choose  the  same  allocations,  women  would
appear  as  being  more  convenient  than  men  (even  though
they  both  have  exactly  the  same  preferences).  Thus,  the
fact  that  women  appear  to  be  more  likely  to  choose  the
convenient  allocation  could  be  explained  by  their  gender
or  simply  by  their  relative  performance  in  the  quiz  (e.g.,
Qdif = qd −  qr).  This  is  particularly  important  in  our  experi-
ment  given  that  women  contribute  signiﬁcantly  less  to  the
surplus.  The  treatment  conditions  (i.e.,  the  reward  levels)
could  also  affect  the  frequency  of  choosing  the  most  con-
venient  allocation,  since  dictators  may  feel  good  or  bad  for
being  paid  more  or  less  than  recipients.  To  disentangle  the
effect  of  these  variables,  a  logit  regression  was  estimated
in  which  the  dependent  variable  is  the  probability  of  choos-
ing  the  fair  allocation  that  gives  the  dictator  the  highest
payoff.  The  explanatory  variables  are  the  dictator’s  gender
(i.e.,  a  dummy  variable  WOMEN  that  takes  the  value  1  if
the  dictator  is  a  woman),  the  treatment  conditions  (i.e.,
the  dummy  variables  DM  and  DL  take  the  value  1  if  dictators
are  paid  more  or  less  than  recipients)  and  the  difference  in
t
t
b
aubject’s  correct  answers  (Qdif =  qd −  qr).  The  estimates  and
he  marginal  effects  (ME)  of  this  speciﬁcation  are  presented
n  the  ﬁrst  columns  of  Table  2  (Model  (1)).  The  second  spec-
ﬁcation  (Model  (2))  is  based  on  a  stepwise  model  in  which
he  choice  of  the  independent  variables  is  carried  out  by
ackward  elimination;  i.e.,  those  variables  that  are  not  sig-o be self-serving. Although I ﬁnd that this is a plausible assump-
ion, the pairwise correlation coefﬁcient suggests no relationship
etween the size of the surplus and the use of the most-convenient
llocation (correlation coefﬁcient = −0.152, p-value = 0.204).
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Table  3  Biased  behavior  and  earnings  in  the  production  stage.
Women  Men
If  yd <  yr dictators  divide  the  surplus  choosing  the  most  convenient  allocation  0.962  0.332
If yd ≥  yr dictators  divide  the  surplus  choosing  the  most  convenient  allocation  0.230  0.017**
p-Values for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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bSigniﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
***Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
Neither  the  treatment  conditions  nor  the  difference  in
orrect  answers  seems  to  have  a  statistically  signiﬁcant
ffect  on  the  frequency  of  choosing  the  biased  allocation.
he  dictator’s  gender,  however,  has  a  signiﬁcant  effect  as
omen  are  27%  more  likely  to  choose  the  biased  allocation
han  men  (ceteris  paribus).  In  fact,  if  we  perform  a  step-
ise  regression,  we  will  conclude  that  the  dictator’s  gender
s  the  only  signiﬁcant  variable  in  explaining  the  frequency
f  choosing  the  most  convenient  allocation.17
esult  4.  Women  are  more  likely  than  men  to  employ  the
air  allocation  that  most  beneﬁts  their  ﬁnancial  payoff.
Although  the  regression  analysis  suggests  that  there
s  no  effect  of  the  relative  performance  on  the  proba-
ility  of  being  self-serving,  recent  evidence  suggest  that
isadvantaged  individuals  might  have  a  tendency  to  over-
ome  their  disadvantage  by  cheating  (e.g.,  Schwieren  and
eichselbaumer,  2010;  Gino  et  al.,  2013).  This,  in  turn,
ould  explain  why  women  are  more  likely  to  be  self-serving
n  the  experiment.  As  they  contribute  to  the  surplus  less
han  their  counterparts,  they  might  feel  entitled  to  take  a
arger  part  of  the  surplus,  showing  then  a  tendency  to  appear
elf-interested.  If  this  were  the  case,  we  should  observe  that
omen  who  have  accumulated  more  money  than  their  coun-
erparts  should  forgo  using  the  most  convenient  allocation.
n  Table  3  we  report  the  p-values  of  a  Wilcoxon  signed-rank
est  to  see  if  the  distribution  of  payoffs  associated  to  dicta-
ors’  allocation  choices  (Fig.  1)  is  the  one  that  yields  them
he  highest  payoff.  Men  and  women  are  considered  sep-
rately  and  perform  the  test  for  cases  in  which  dictators
re  in  disadvantage  (advantage)  position  with  regard  to  the
ccumulated  surplus,  yd <  yr (yd ≥  yr).
Interestingly,  there  exists  a  tendency  for  dictators  to  be
elf-serving  when  they  have  accumulated  less  than  their
ounterparts.  This  occurs  both  for  men  and  women.18 Stri-
ingly  enough,  women  who  accumulated  more  than  their
17 In Appendix D, the interested reader can see a robustness check
f this result using the data in Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido
2012).
18 This ﬁnding is in line with the interpretation of Gino et al. (2013),
ho ﬁnd that women tend to misreport in a competitive environ-
ents (i.e., a problem-solving task) in which they perform worse
han men but do misreport their score in non-competitive envi-
onments (i.e., rolling a dice and inform the experimenter about
he result). In the authors’ opinion, it is not the case that women
heat more in competitive tasks, but that disadvantaged individuals
end to overcome their disadvantage by cheating in competitive
asks (see also Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010 for a similar
nterpretation).
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tounterparts  still  show  this  tendency  to  be  self-serving,
hereas  men  do  not.
. Conclusions
his  paper  studies  gender  differences  in  distributive  justice
y  means  of  a  controlled  laboratory  experiment.  In  the  ﬁrst
hase,  subjects  solve  a  questionnaire  to  earn  money.  In  the
econd  phase,  dictators  divide  the  surplus  according  to  ﬁve
ifferent  allocations,  some  of  which  represents  a  fairness
deal.
There  is  evidence  that  women  are  more  likely  than  men
o  employ  the  fair  allocation  that  most  beneﬁts  their  ﬁnan-
ial  payoff.  The  data  also  suggest  that  women  are  more
ensitive  to  the  context  as  their  allocation  choices  depend
n  whether  they  have  accumulated  more  or  less  money  than
heir  counterparts.  This  is  not  the  case  for  men’s  allocation
hoices.
Overall,  these  ﬁndings  suggest  a subtle  but  signiﬁcant
hange  in  our  understanding  of  what  other  studies  have
ound  with  respect  to  the  effect  of  gender  on  problems  of
istributive  justice.  The  existence  of  the  production  stage
as  probably  contributed  these  new  ﬁndings  on  gender  dif-
erences.  Although  this  feature  of  the  experimental  design
as  been  shown  to  be  a  key  component  to  study  fairness
Cherry  et  al.,  2002;  Konow,  2000;  Cappelen  et  al.,  2007)  it
as  been  widely  ignored  in  papers  that  investigate  gender
ifferences  in  behavior.
Still,  there  are  some  things  to  be  done.  Although  this
aper  provides  a  correlation  between  the  dictator’s  gender
nd  the  self-serving  use  of  justice  principles,  the  sample  size
72  dictators)  is  relatively  small  given  that  there  are  three
ifferent  treatment  conditions.  In  that  regard,  it  would  be
eneﬁcial  to  replicate  the  current  study  with  more  obser-
ations.  Turning  to  a  discussion  of  a  rationale  for  the  main
esult,  one  possible  explanation  might  be  offered  by  the  dual
nterest  theory  (Lynne,  1999;  Czap  et  al.,  2012).  This  sug-
ests  that  there  is  a  natural,  inherent  cognitive  dissonance
n  the  brain,  which  is  reﬂected  in  the  egoistic--hedonistic
ased  self-interest.  This  tendency  needs  to  be  tempered
y  the  tendency  to  empathy-sympathy  based  on  other
nterests  which  refers  to  the  subject’s  capacity  to  step
nto  someone  else’s  shoes  (empathy)  and  his/her  concern
or  others’  welfare  (sympathy).  The  idea  of  designing  an
xperiment  that  investigates  the  extent  to  which  women
nd  men  differ  in  these  dimensions  would  be  an  excellent
rea  for  future  research.19 The  possibility  of  considering  the
19 The evidence gleaned from this experiment would also be useful
o reconcile the data in dictator games with and without produc-
justi
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H
HAn  experimental  study  of  gender  differences  in  distributive  
dictator’s  behavior  as  a  third-party  view  (i.e.,  comparing
their  choices  when  they  are  involved  in  the  problem  and
their  choices  for  other  subjects)  or  extending  the  game
to  the  possibility  of  taking  (List,  2007;  Bardsley,  2008;
Cappelen  et  al.,  2013)  seem  also  fruitful  areas  for  future
research  into  gender  differences  in  distributive  justice.
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